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Notes
ALL QUIET ON THE PAPER FRONT: ASSERTING A FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE TO AVOID PRODUCTION OF
CORPORATE DOCUMENTS IN IN RE THREE GRAND JURY
SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 29, 1999
I. INTRODUCTION
Crime on America's streets is at its lowest level in years.' Meanwhile,
crime in America's corporate suites is rising.2 White-collar crime is now
the most pervasive challenge confronting law enforcement agencies.
3
1. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearings on H.R. 4690 Before the Senate Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 46, 61 (2000) (statement of Janet Reno,
Attorney Gen.) (stating that for seventh consecutive year crime has fallen in every
region of America); see also CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMI-
NAL VICTIMIZATION 1999, at 1 (2000) (stating that since 1994 violent crime has
continually declined). See generally MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEYING CRIME VICTIMS: THE NATIONAL
CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, 1973-92 (1993) (providing data showing street
crimes have declined from peak 1981 levels); Gun Numbers (NPR radio broadcast,
Oct. 9, 2000) (discussing report finding that violent crime has dropped forty per-
cent from 1993 to 1997).
2. See Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Corporate and White-Collar Crime: A View by the
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 287, 287 (1980)
(stating that crime "in the suites" will escalate); see also TONY G. POVEDA, RETHINK-
ING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 75 (1994) (noting that FBI crimes index for 1981 to 1990
shows that arrest rate for embezzlement increased by 63.2%); Jill Hudson, White-
Collar, Juvenile Crime Jump, BALT. SUN, Feb. 25, 1997, at lB (stating that in Howard
County, Maryland violent crime slightly increased in 1996 while white-collar crime
soared); John Webster, Editorial, New Admonition: First Do No Scams, SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW WASH., Nov. 11, 1997, at B6 (reporting increase in white-collar crime).
3. See Hon. William H. Webster, An Examination of FBI Theory and Methodology
Regarding White-Collar Crime Investigation and Prevention, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275,
275 (1980) (asserting that white-collar crime has become one of law enforcement's
greatest challenges); see also William P. Barr, Foreword: Seventh Survey of White-Collar
Crime, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 169, 170 (1992) (noting that Congress has authorized
unprecedented staffing levels for federal prosecutors to deal with explosion in
white-collar crime); G. Robert Blakley & Ronald Goldstock, "On The Waterfront":
RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 341 (1980) (arguing that
racketeering in America is pervasive and persistent problem). For various discus-
sions on how the government has responded to the increase in white-collar crime,
see Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo, Preface to the First Volume of WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES, at x (Otto G. Obermaier &
Robert G. Morvillo eds., 1990); Lisa Eckelbecker, White-Collar Crime Is Called a
Deadly Threat to Country, WORCESTER TELE. & GAZETTE, May 14, 1997, at El; Robert
G. Morvillo, An Interview with District Attorney Morgenthau, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 2, 1990, at
3.
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This upsurge in white-collar crime poses a serious threat to America's eco-
nomic and social fabric. 4 Moreover, white-collar crime violates the public
For years scholars have debated the precise meaning of white-collar crime. See
infra (discussing debate). Edwin H. Sutherland was the first legal scholar to define
white-collar crime, choosing to define it as "crime committed by a person of re-
spectability and high social status in the course of his occupation." EDWIN H. SUTH-
ER[AND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 7 (1983). For general discussions on the debate
over white-collar crime's proper definition, see generally POVEDA, supra note 2, at
68-70; Lawrence S. Goldman & Jill R. Shellow-Lavine, Pre-Indictment Representation
in White-Collar Cases, 24 CHAMPION 18, 18 (2000); Leonard Orland, Reflections on
Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 501,
504-10 (1980); Webster, supra, at 276-79.
The United States Department ofJustice has also internally debated the defi-
nition of white-collar crime. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRIORITIES
FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME: REPORT OF THE
AT-rORNEY GENERAL BENJAMIN R. CIVILETrI 5 (1980) (defining white-collar offenses
as constituting "those classes of non-violent illegal activities which principally in-
volve traditional notions of deceit, deception, concealment, manipulation, breach
of trust, subterfuge or illegal circumvention"), with U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ArORNEY GENERAL 39 (1983) (defining white-collar crime as "ille-
gal acts that use deceit and concealment-rather than the application or threat of
physical force or violence-to obtain money, property, or service; to avoid the pay-
ment or loss of money; or to secure a business or personal advantage"), and Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRACKING OFFENDERS: WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME (1986) (stating that white-collar crime is "nonviolent crime for fi-
nancial gain committed by means of deception").
4. See PresidentJimmy Carter, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary Luncheon of
the Los Angeles County Bar Association (May 4, 1978), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS-JIMMY CARTER 837 (1978) (stating that officials who abuse their rank
damage integrity of nation in profound and lasting economic and social ways). See
generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, at 10 (comparing economic and social damage
stemming from white-collar crime). Collectively, white-collar criminals steal about
$107 billion annually, an amount six thousand times that stolen annually in bank
robberies and nine times that stolen annually in all thefts. SeeJEFFREY REIMAN, THE
RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON 90-91 (1990) (estimating that white-
collar crime costs $107 billion annually and comparing figure to other crimes).
The last official government attempt to estimate the annual cost of white-col-
lar crime occurred in 1974. See generally U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A HANDBOOK
ON WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 4 (1974) (estimating economic loss in 1973 from white-
collar crime). There are no current government statements on the annual cost of
white-collar crime. See REIMAN, supra, at 90 (stating that latest government estimate
of annual cost of white-collar crime is Chamber of Commerce's 1974 report); cf
POVEDA, supra note 2, at 68 (remarking that one of problems in white-collar re-
search is that government has no centralized recording system monitoring its dis-
tribution and trends). Many commentators therefore confine their estimates of
financial costs to one kind of white-collar crime. See, e.g., Kenneth Carlson & Peter
Finn, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES: FEDERAL OF-
FENSES AND OFFENDERS 4 (1993) (asserting that average value of racketeering of-
fense is $1.9 million); William F. Weld, Statement Before House of Representatives
Committee on Government Operations Concerning Bank Fraud (Nov. 19, 1987), in WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 1988: REPRESENTING CORPORATIONS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
THEIR DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 56, 57 (1988) (reporting that bank
fraud losses amounted to $1.1 billion in 1986); Barr, supra note 3, at 170 (stating
that institutional fraud cost over $10.5 billion in fiscal years 1989-1991); Eck-
elbecker, supra note 3, at El (remarking that, annually, health care fraud costs
$100 billion, telemarketing fraud costs $40 billion and institutional crimes such as
[Vol. 46: p. 547
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss3/2
trust, lowers social morale and produces large-scale 'social disorganiza-
tion.5 Despite its profound effects, white-collar crime has not received as
much popular or scholarly attention as street crime.6 As a result, outside
of the white-collar bar, white-collar criminal procedures go unscrutinized.
7
One such white-collar criminal procedure vexing the United States
Supreme Court has been whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination encompasses corporate documents.8 The Court has
check fraud, counterfeiting and mortgage fraud costs $12.5 billion); Webster,
supra note 2, at B6 (declaring that federal government estimates that fraud costs
$23 billion a year).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000) (discussing social impacts of white-collar
crime); H.R. REp. No. 101-681, at 69 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6472,
6473 (discussing "heavy price" society pays for white-collar crime); S. REP. No. 91-
617, at 1-2 (1969) (discussing impacts of organized crime); President's Statement
Upon Signing S.3266 (Nov. 29, 1990), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS-
GEORGE BUSH 1715 (1994) (stating that financial institutional fraud has severe im-
pact on society); Eckelbecker, supra note 3, at El (comparing large-scale social
disorganization resulting from white-collar crime with little effect that street crime
has on social organization); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 12 CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL 162-I-A (2000) (asserting that fight against white-collar crime will be force
for positive cultural change); Conyers, supra note 2, at 288 (stating that white-col-
lar crime destroys moral fabric of society); David Marshall Nissman, Interview with
Gerald E. McDowell, U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULL. 4, 5 (June 1999) (arguing that white-
collar crime threatens political and societal stability).
6. See Eckelbecker, supra note 3, at El (noting that white-collar crime does not
receive attention lavished on violent crime). One reason for this lack of popular
and scholarly reporting is that white-collar crime litigation is often concerned with
pre-indictment communications, which have been traditionally ignored in aca-
demic and judicial writings. SeeJed S. Rakoff, Four Postulates of White-Collar Practice,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 12, 1993, at 3 (stating that pre-indictment stage of white-collar crime
is largely ignored in most writings); see also John R. Wing & Harris J. Yale, Grand
Jury Practice, in 1 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 8.01
(Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo eds., 1990) (implying that lack of report-
ing on white-collar crime stems from fact that white-collar litigation occurs at
grand jury stage). But see Gilbert Geis & Colin Goff, Introduction to WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME, supra note 3, at x (arguing that inadequate attention has been paid to
white-collar crime because of close relationship between white-collar offenders and
those traditionally calling attention to crime, such as newspapers and judges).
7. See Geis & Goff, supra note 6, at x (arguing that white-collar practice and
procedures are not scrutinized). For a notable exception to the proposition that
white-collar crime issues are not adequately scrutinized, see generally American
Criminal Law Review's annual "Survey of White Collar Crime," currently in its 15th
edition.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself .. "). For general discussions of the Fifth
Amendment, see 4J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAw § 2263 (1st ed. 1904-05); Michael Nordtvedt & Wesley D. Bizzell,
Fifth Amendment at Trial, 88 GEO. L.J. 1427 (2000); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimina-
tion and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (1988).
The primary purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is to avoid confronting a witness "with the 'cruel trilemma' of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt." Martin-Trigona v. Belford, 732 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1984)
(quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). The Supreme
Court has also said that the privilege is rooted in the protection of personal pri-
vacy. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416 (1976) (Brennan,J., con-
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held that because a corporation is not a natural person, it has no Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse to comply with a subpoena duces tecum.9
Over time, scholars have labeled this holding the "collective entity
doctrine." 10
The Court has had greater difficulty determining whether the collec-
tive entity doctrine extends to a corporate custodian and thus prevents the
custodian from asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege."I It appeared that
the Court was poised to allow a custodian to assert the privilege following
Fisher v. United States.12 Although this case involved non-corporate docu-
ments, Fisher established "the act-of-production doctrine," which holds that
the act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena has communica-
tive aspects separate from the document's contents. 13 The Court ex-
amined whether the act-of-production doctrine shields a custodian from a
subpoena for corporate documents in Braswell v. United States. 4 The Bras-
curring) ("Expressions are legion in opinions of this Court that the protection of
personal privacy is a central purpose of the privilege against compelled self-incrim-
ination."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The Fifth Amend-
ment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment."); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (noting that privilege respects private
inner sanctum); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("[I]t is the inva-
sion of [a person's] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property" that constitutes essence of offense that violates Fifth Amendment
privilege).
9. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) ("[W]e are of the opinion that
there is a clear distinction ... between an individual and a corporation, and that
the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination
.... "), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). A
subpoena duces tecum is a subpoena ordering a witness to appear and to bring spec-
ified documents or records. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999) (de-
fining subpoena duces tecum).
10. See generally Robert Johnson et al., Procedural Issues, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
983, 993-95 (1999) (defining collective entity doctrine). The collective entity doc-
trine holds that because an artificial entity can act only through its officers, recog-
nizing that officer's Fifth Amendment privilege would be tantamount to asserting
the privilege on behalf of the corporation, which possesses no such privilege. See
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 810-12 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam) (defining collective entity doctrine).
11. For a further discussion of whether a custodian of corporate documents
may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid production of corporate docu-
ments, see infra notes 37-94 and accompanying text.
12. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For a further discussion of Fisher, see infra notes 62-
69 and accompanying text.
13. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (stating holding). For general discussions of the
act-of-production doctrine, see Peter J. Henning, Finding What Was Lost: Sorting
Out the Custodian's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination from the Compelled Production of
Records, 77 NEB. L. REV. 34, 49-58 (1998); Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production
of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 180-87 (1996).
14. 487 U.S. 99 (1988). The Braswell Court framed the issue before it as
"whether the custodian of corporate records may resist a subpoena for such
records on the ground that the act of production would incriminate him in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment." Braswell, 487 U.S. at 100.
[Vol. 46: p. 547
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well Court held that the collective entity doctrine barred a corporate custo-
dian from asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege, even if the act of
production would be personally incriminating. 15
Following Braswell, lower courts generally applied the collective entity
doctrine to all subpoenas for corporate documents. 16 This trend was cur-
tailed by In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 29,
1999.17 This recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a former employee could successfully assert a
Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege to avoid producing corpo-
rate documents.18
This Note explores the decision of the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas
court. Part II examines the leading Supreme Court case law on the collec-
tive entity and act-of-production doctrines and lower court case law on
whether a former employee may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege. 19
Part III sets out the facts and history of the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas
case. 20 Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of the reasoning employed by
the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court.2 1 Part V takes a critical look at the
Second Circuit's conclusions based on its application of the law to the
facts of the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas case.22 Part VI focuses on the possi-
ble impact Three Grand Jury Subpoenas will have on the government, corpo-
rations and the courts, because the decision constructed a loophole
through which custodians may evade the collective entity doctrine. 23
15. For a further discussion of the Court's holding in Braswell, see infra notes
70-80 and accompanying text.
16. See PeterJ. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 405,
423-27 (1992) (stating that, following Braswell courts applied collective entity doc-
trine to subpoenas for corporate documents). For a further discussion of lower
court decisions following Braswell, see infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
17. 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999).
18. See Three GrandJury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 183-84 ("[W]e conclude that
[Doe I, Doe II and Doe III] may claim a Fifth Amendment act of production privi-
lege with respect to the documents called for in the 1999 subpoenas."). For a
further discussion of the Second Circuit's holding in Three Grand Jury Subpoenas,
see infra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of this background information, see infra notes
24-94 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the facts of Three Grand Juiy Subpoenas, see infra
notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court's reason-
ing, see infra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court's reason-
ing, see infra notes 135-208 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the possible impact of Three Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas, see infra notes 209-28 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
Two trends dominate the Supreme Court's decisions on whether a
custodian may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid producing cor-
porate documents. 24 First, the Court has made certain that its decisions
do not detrimentally impact law enforcement. 25 Second, the Court has
generally expanded the collective entity doctrine. 26
A. The Early Years: Applying the Fifth Amendment to Subpoenaed Documents
Legal scholars generally agree that Boyd v. United States27 began the
Supreme Court's ad hoc application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to
documentary evidence. 28 The controversy in Boyd arose when the federal
24. For a further discussion of the Court's treatment of corporate custodians
asserting Fifth Amendment privilege, see infra notes 37-80 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the Court's concern with aiding law enforce-
ment, see infra notes 37-77 and accompanying text.
26. For a further discussion of the expansion of the collective entity doctrine,
see infra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
27. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28. See Mitchell Lewis Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business
Documents, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 390 (1987) (stating that analysis of Fifth Amend-
ment privilege and documentary evidence must begin with Boyd); see also Samuel A.
Alito,Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 27,
30 (1986) (beginning analysis with Boyd); Craig Peyton Gaumer & Charles L. Nail,
Jr., Truth or Consequences: The Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 520 (1997)
(noting that privilege against self-incrimination was first extended to contents of
documents in Boyd); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and
Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REv. 343, 345 (1979) (beginning
analysis with Boyd); Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents: Cut-
ting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 444 (1984) (same). But see Richard
A. Nagareda, Compulsion "To Be a Witness" and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1575, 1584 (1999) (arguing that Boyd is not beginning of Court's constitu-
tional treatment of self-incriminatory documents).
Nagareda argues that United States v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 352 (1832),
should be the beginning of a constitutional account of the Court's treatment of
self-incriminatory documents. See Nagareda, supra, at 1584 (beginning analysis
with Reyburn). The Court in Reyburn was presented with the narrow question of
whether the Government had made an adequate showing of its inability to obtain
the original copy of a commission. See Reyburn, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 365 (stating
issue). The Court found that the Government had done all it reasonably could to
obtain the original, so the trial court did not err when it allowed the Government
to use secondary evidence of the commission's contents. See id. at 366 (upholding
trial court). Nevertheless, the Court said in dicta that had the person thought to
have received the original commission from the defendant been required to ap-
pear as a witness, he "could not have been compelled to produce the commission,
and thereby furnish evidence against himself." Id. at 366-67.
The Supreme Court has described its application of the Fifth Amendment
privilege to business documents as being ad hoc in several decisions. See, e.g., Bras-
well v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 121 (1988) (KennedyJ, dissenting) (noting that
"Boyd generated nearly a century of doctrinal ambiguity"); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 434 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that Court's applica-
tion of Fifth Amendment privilege to documentary evidence is "somewhat ad hod');
[Vol. 46: p. 547552
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government charged E.A. Boyd & Sons with using false invoices to avoid
paying duties on glass.29 In order to establish the quantity and value of
properly imported glass, the Government requested, and the trial court
ordered, E.A. Boyd to produce an invoice.
3 0
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments when it ordered Boyd to produce the invoice. 3 1 In
reaching its decision, the Court relied on privacy principles and common
law property notions.32 Following property notions, the Court said that
because the defendant had superior property rights in the disputed in-
see also Henning, supra note 16, at 415 (saying that issue of production of business
documents has "tortured history").
29. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616, 617-19 (providing facts of case).
30. See id. at 618 (stating that court order directed defendants to produce
invoices of twenty-nine cases of previously imported glass); see also Fisher, 425 U.S.
at 406-07 (discussing Boyd). After Boyd produced this document, the jury found
for the United States and condemned the seized glass. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618
(discussing lower court proceedings).
31. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 ("[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him
of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of" the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments); see also Nagareda, supra note 28, at 1578 (stating Court in Boyd
held that Fifth Amendment, among other constitutional provisions, bars govern-
ment from compelling persons suspected of crime to turn over self-incriminating
documents).
Although the Court steeped its decision in both Fourth Amendment and Fifth
Amendment parlance, the Boyd decision is, for practical purposes, a decision on
the proper scope of a subpoena duces tecum. See Rothman, supra note 28, at 391-92
(asserting that although Boyd is devoted to law of search and seizure, Boyd is really
Fifth Amendment case); cf Nagareda, supra note 28, at 1586 (stating that Boyd's
notion that order to produce invoices is tantamount to Fourth Amendment seizure
stemmed from legislative history of statute at issue in Boyd). Since the decision in
Boyd, the Supreme Court has expressly disavowed the view that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies in an analysis of whether the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
clause should bar production of documents. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 121 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (complaining that Boyd's reasoning is inconsistent with Court's
present understanding of Fourth Amendment); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407 (holding
that subsequent decisions limited application of Fourth Amendment to subpoenas
after Boyd); id. at 421 n.5 (Brennan,J., concurring) (claiming that proposition that
Boyd's holding ultimately rested on Fourth Amendment "could not be more incor-
rect"); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 597 (1904) ("The court held in [Boyd] ...
that such procedure was in violation of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments;
... [nevertheless,] the compulsory production of such documents did not come
within the terms of the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search or seizure
.); cf U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-19.00 (1999) (stating
that subpoena is not search warrant and does not implicate Fourth Amendment).
32. See Steven M. Harris & David F. Axelrod, New Fifth Amendment Frontier:
Compelled "Consent" to Production of Foreign Bank Records, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
1989: REPRESENTING CORPORATIONS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR DIREC-
TORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 217 (1989) (saying Boyd's "touchstone" was zone of
privacy guaranteed by Constitution); Rothman, supra note 28, at 392 (arguing that
Boyd's basic concern was privacy rights). For a general discussion of Boyd's contri-
bution to the law of privacy, see generally Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Consti-
tutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv.
945 (1977).
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voice, the trial court's production demand was improper.33 Moreover, the
Court focused on Boyd's privacy rights by describing the invoice as a "pri-
vate" document belonging to the E.A. Boyd & Sons partnership.3 4 Thus,
the Court concluded that the Government could not seize the invoice sim-
ply through a court-ordered subpoena. 35 In speaking for the first time on
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to a subpoena for documents,
the Court gave full-scale protection to a defendant who was directed to
produce self-incriminating documents. 36
B. The Bull Court: The Collective Entity Doctrine Takes Stock
Twenty years after Boyd, in a radically altered economic and political
landscape, the Court in Hale v. Henke137 confronted the question of
whether a corporation could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
through a testifying agent.38 The Hale Court thus faced a dilemma; the
33. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624 (differentiating between Government's attempt
to extort private books and papers from defendant and hypothetical case of stolen
or excisable articles); see also Henning, supra note 16, at 416 (stating that Boyd used
property law concept to define private enclave guarded by intertwined Fourth and
Fifth Amendments); Nagareda, supra note 28, at 1587-88 (maintaining that Court
stressed defendant's property rights in disputed invoices above claims of all
others).
34. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624 (describing invoice as private document).
35. See id. (asserting that court tried to extort from party his private books and
papers to make him liable for penalty); id. at 631-32 ("[A] ny compulsory discovery
by... compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him
of crime.., is contrary to the principles of a free government."); see also Rothman,
supra note 28, at 392 (arguing that when Court described invoices as "private" it
meant documents were partnership records that government had no right to seize
under privacy law).
36. See Nagareda, supra note 28, at 1575 (stating that Boyd extended constitu-
tional protection for self-incriminating documents to its fullest scale); Jack W.
Campbell IV, Note, Revoking the "Fishing License": Recent Decisions Place Unwarranted
Restrictions on Administrative Agencies' Power to Subpoena Personal Financial Records, 49
VAND. L. REv. 395, 398 (1996) (claiming that Boyd represents "'highwater mark' of
• ..protection against enforcement of all subpoenas"). Because of Boyd, lower
courts began to allow corporations receiving subpoenas to assert a Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to avoid production. See, e.g., Cent. Stock & Grain Exch. v. Bd. of
Trade, 63 N.E. 740, 744 (Ill. 1902) (per curiam) (allowing corporate party to de-
cline producing documents "on the claim of constitutional privilege"); Davies v.
Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 4 N.Y.S. 373, 374 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (finding examination of
corporate officer is examination of corporation and thus it is impermissible to ob-
tain that which will subject corporate bank to penalty or forfeiture).
37. 201 U.S. 43 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964).
38. See Rothman, supra note 28, at 398-99 (discussing change in America from
1897 to 1904). Following Boyd, America's economy experienced an explosion of
corporate consolidation that created corporations with total assets of six-billion
dollars and corporations that produced three-fourths of America's industrial out-
put. See id. (discussing economic expansion). Reacting to America's exponential
corporate growth in the early 1900s, Progressives challenged the solidification of
power in corporate America. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 231
(1955) (discussing Progressive movement). For a general analysis of how the Su-
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Court's language in Boyd had led lower courts to hold that every recipient
of a subpoena for documents, even recipients holding ordinary business
documents, could assert a Fifth Amendment privilege.
3 9
To resolve this dilemma, the Court held that a corporation could not
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege. 40 In doing so, Hale established the
collective entity doctrine and thus ensured that the application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to corporations that followed Boyd was short-lived.
41
In order to distinguish Hale from Boyd, which had made repeated refer-
ences to "private papers," the Court contrasted the rights of natural per-
sons with those of corporations. 42 Differentiating between a person and a
corporation, the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment applies only
preme Court's decision in Hale can be viewed as a product of its time, see Roth-
man, supra note 28, at 399.
The Hale decision grew out of an investigation of price fixing in the tobacco
industry. See Rothman, supra note 28, at 394-96 (discussing facts). The Govern-
ment subpoenaed the MacAndrews & Forbes Corporation, calling for the corpora-
tion to produce a broad array of records, as the Government hoped to find formal
agreements allocating purchases and sales among MacAndrews & Forbes and six
other firms that allowed these parties to control ninety percent of the U.S. tobacco
market. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 64 (giving facts of case); see also Braswell v. United
States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) (providing facts of Hale); Peter J. Henning, The
Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitu-
tional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 816-17
(1996) (discussing facts of Hale); Rothman, supra note 28, at 394-96 (same).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 75 F. 94, 97 (C.C.D.N.J. 1896)
(refusing to require corporation to produce records to Government because of
Boyd); see also Henning, supra note 38, at 817-18 (describing Boyd's effect on lower
courts).
40. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 76-77 (stating holding).
41. SeeJohn Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American
Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 902 (1999) (arguing that
application of Fifth Amendment privilege to corporations was short-lived following
Hale).
42. For a further discussion of the language the Court used in Boyd, see supra
notes 27-36 and accompanying text. The Court considered natural persons as ow-
ing no duty to the state, as their power to contract proceeded the state's formation.
See Hale, 201 U.S. at 74 (stating that natural person is "entitled to carry on his
private business in his own way ... since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond
the protection of his life and property"); see also Rothman, supra note 28, at 394-95
(discussing Court's characterization of natural person). Meanwhile, the Court
characterized the corporation in a diametrically opposite way, stating that a corpo-
ration exists only through the state's permission. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75 (find-
ing corporation is creature of state and "[i] ts rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation"); see also Henning, supra
note 38, at 796-98 (discussing distinctions Hale made between natural person and
corporation); David Graver, Comment, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corpo-
rate Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235, 238 (1999) (discussing Court's
treatment of corporations as artificial entity existing only in contemplation of law).
Therefore, the Court found a reserved right in the legislature to investigate corpo-
rations. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 75 (stating that legislature possesses reserved right to
investigate corporation to determine if it has exceeded its state-bestowed power).
20011 NOTE 555
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to natural persons and does not allow a corporation to refuse to comply
with a subpoena duces tecum.
4 3
Although Hale receded the high-water mark of the Court's Fifth
Amendment protection, the decision failed to extinguish questions con-
cerning whether a corporate custodian could resist a subpoena for corpo-
rate documents by invoking his own Fifth Amendment privilege. 44 The
Court answered that a corporate custodian may not personally invoke the
Fifth Amendment in Wilson v. United States.45 In Wilson, the Court
43. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 74 ("[W]e are of the opinion that there is a clear
distinction ... between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no
right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the
State."); see also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (discussing hold-
ing of Hale as establishing privilege against self-incrimination as "purely personal
one" that cannot be asserted "by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corpo-
ration"); Henning, supra note 38, at 885 (arguing that Hale established corpora-
tions do not have all criminal constitutional rights granted to people); Witt, supra
note 41, at 902 n.10 (stating that Hale held corporations were unable to claim Fifth
Amendment privilege because privilege was personal to testifying witness); Scott A.
Trainor, Note, A Comparative Analysis of a Corporation's Right Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2139, 2140 (1995) (asserting that Hale established right
of self-incrimination to protect only natural persons). Hale's reasoning that there
is a distinction between natural persons and corporations was by no means a set-
tled issue in 1906. See WIc.MORE, supra note 8, § 2259 (stating unambiguously that
corporations were covered by Fifth Amendment privilege against personal incrimi-
nation); see also United States v. N.W. Express Stage & Transp. Co., 164 U.S. 686,
692-93 (1897) (holding that natural person, like corporation, is citizen); McKinley
v. Wheeler, 130 U.S. 630, 635 (1889) (same); Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87-88 (1809) (holding corporations are citizens in order to
determine whether they meet requirements for federal jurisdiction), overruled in
part by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497
(1844).
44. See United States v. Braswell, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) (finding Hale settled
that corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege, but not addressing whether
corporate officer could resist subpoena for corporate documents by invoking his
personal privilege). Hale had not addressed this question because the custodian
complying with the subpoena had been protected by immunity. See Hale, 201 U.S.
at 67-70 (stating custodian protected by immunity); see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at 105
(stating that custodian in Hale had immunity). For a further discussion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege asserted in Hale, see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying
text.
45. 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The situation in Wilson arose when a subpoena was
served on a corporation requesting that it produce corporate documents. See Wil-
son, 221 U.S. at 368-71 (stating facts); see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at 106 (giving facts
of Wilson). Wilson and four accomplices were under investigation for mail fraud
and conspiracy for their allegedly illegal sale of shares of United Wireless Tele-
graph Company. See Rothman, supra note 28, at 410-11 (providing facts). As part
of this investigation, the Government served subpoenas duces tecum on the United
Wireless Telegraph Company, demanding production of the company's "letter
press copy books." See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 368 (describing subpoena); see also Roth-
man, supra note 28, at 411 (same). Wilson himself, as president of the company,
answered the subpoena served on the company. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 368
(describing capacity in which Wilson appeared before grand jury). Wilson then
asserted his personal privilege on the ground that producing the documents would
incriminate him. See id. at 368-69 (quoting written statement Wilson provided to
grand jury).
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss3/2
2001] NOTE 557
reasoned that the nature of the records as corporate, and the visitator-
ial powers of the state to investigate corporations, required that the
custodian produce corporate documents. 4 6 Moreover, relying on what
scholars have since deemed the "white-collar rationale," the Court
cautioned that allowing the exercise of a Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege would defeat the state's investigative and oversight authority.
4 7
46. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 378-86 (providing reasoning of Court). First, the
Court reasoned that the nature of the documents as corporate should be the focus
of the Court's inquiry. See id. at 382 ("[B]y virtue of their character ... the books
and papers are held subject to examination by the demanding authority, [so] the
custodian has no privilege to refuse production although their contents tend to
criminate him."); see also Rothman, supra note 28, at 415 (stating that Wilson relied
on corporate ownership of subpoenaed documents). The Court concluded that
Wilson held the documents pursuant to the corporation's authority and accepted
the "incident obligation to permit inspection." See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382 (discuss-
ing capacity of custodian). As a result, the obligation to allow inspection attached
to the records and bound Wilson. See id. at 382, 384-85 (holding that custodian
must comply with subpoena).
The Court also relied on the state's reserved power of visitation over corpora-
tions to deny the custodian's Fifth Amendment claim. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-
85 (discussing reserved state power of visitation); see also Rothman, supra note 28,
at 412-13 (discussing role of chartering state's reserved power of visitation). Fi-
nally, the Court concluded that corporate documents lack the requisite element of
privacy essential for the privilege to attach. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
92 (1974) (stating that Wilson can be understood as recognizing corporate docu-
ments do not contain requisite element of privacy essential for Fifth Amendment
privilege against incrimination to attach); cf. Rothman, supra note 28, at 417-18
(discussing diminished expectation of privacy that attaches to corporate docu-
ments following Wilson).
47. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-85 (discussing how visitatorial power of state
would be thwarted if Court recognized defendant's claim of Fifth Amendment
privilege). In reaching the conclusion that the state's visitatorialpowers would be
diminished, the Court said:
The reserved power of visitation would seriously be embarrassed, if not
wholly defeated in its effective exercise, if guilty officers could refuse in-
spection of the records and papers of the corporation. No personal privi-
lege to which they are entitled requires such a conclusion. It would not
be a recognition, but an unjustifiable extension, of the personal rights
they enjoy .... But the visitatorial power which exists with respect to the
corporation of necessity reaches the corporate books without regard to
the conduct of the custodian.
Id.
Despite its strongly worded defense of the reserved visitatorial powers, the
Court never adequately explained why this power could defeat the Fifth Amend-
ment. See Rothman, supra note 28, at 416-18 (stating that Court failed to explain
why visitatorial powers trumped Fifth Amendment). The answer may be that the
Court was concerned with the expansion of corporate America and was sensitive to
the fact that something had to be done to combat corporate crime. See id. (noting
that what was left unsaid in Wilson was that Court was concerned with impact of
corporate crime and need to control growing corporate power).
The term "white collar rationale" is often employed by PeterJ. Henning in his
authoritative reviews of white-collar procedures. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 16,
at 415 (employing white-collar rationale). Henning defines the white-collar ratio-
nale as the notion that the rules of non-white-collar crime cases involving the Fifth
Amendment should not apply to complex economic crimes. See id. at 412 (defin-
11
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The Wilson Court thus expanded Hale and the collective entity doc-
trine.4
8
In the early and mid-twentieth century, the Court further expanded
the collective entity doctrine through three cases. 49 First, the Court in
Wheeler v. United States50 expanded the collective entity doctrine to encom-
pass corporate documents of a dissolved corporation. 5 1 Thirty years later,
the Court expanded the collective entity doctrine in United States v.
White.52 In this case, the Court applied the collective entity doctrine to a
ing white-collar rationale). The effect of the white-collar rationale is that in white-
collar crime cases the Court has not focused on the overarching issue of how to
delineate the relationship between the government and white-collar defendants;
instead the Court has looked at the discrete issue presented and the impact that
the Court's decision would have on the government's ability to investigate white-
collar crimes. See id. at 411-13 (discussing application of white-collar rationale).
Since Hale, the Court has relied on the white-collar rationale to reject corpo-
rate claims to the privilege against self-incrimination. See Henning, supra note 38,
at 801 (arguing that since Hale Court has used white-collar rationale to reject cor-
porations' privilege claims). Hale's language supports this view. See, e.g., Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 57 (1906) (discussing impact grant of privilege to custodian
would have on law enforcement).
48. See Henning, supra note 16, at 417 (stating that Wilson expanded Hale). In
Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911), a companion case to Wilson, the Court
expanded on its rulings in Hale and Wilson by finding that a corporate officer
could not invoke the Fifth Amendment even when a grand jury subpoena had
been directed to him, rather than to the corporation. See Dreier, 221 U.S. at 400
(stating holding of court); see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at 106-07 (giving holding in
Dreier). In denying the custodian's claim of privilege, the Court in Dreier held that
the custodian possessed no privilege with respect to the corporate books and that
it was his duty to comply with the subpoena. See Dreier, 221 U.S. at 400 (finding
custodian had no privilege and was under duty to produce corporate documents).
49. For a further discussion of the expansion of the collective entity doctrine,
see infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
50. 226 U.S. 478 (1913). Wheeler stemmed from an investigation into whether
two associates of Shaw, Inc. used the U.S. mail in a fraud scheme. See Wheeler, 226
U.S. at 482-83 (providing facts). The Government served subpoenas duces tecum on
Warren B. Wheeler, as treasurer, and Stillman Shaw, as president. See id. at 482
(stating facts). The corporation was dissolved at the time these subpoenas were
served. See id. Wheeler and Shaw appeared before the grand jury without the
documents and orally asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege. See id. at 483-85
(providing Wheeler's statement before grand jury).
51. See id. at 487 (providing holding of district court). Finding the corpora-
tion's dissolution immaterial, the Court held that the collective entity doctrine re-
quired the production of the corporation's documents, as the essential character
of the documents remained corporate. See id. at 488-90 (holding that it was imma-
terial that corporation no longer existed, as essential character of documents did
not change).
Fourteen days after Wheeler, the Court further expanded the collective entity
doctrine in Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913). In this case, the Court ap-
plied the collective entity doctrine to a defunct company, holding that although
the corporation stopped doing business, the essential character of the documents
remained corporate. See id. at 79-80 (stating holding).
52. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). The Court in White was required to determine
whether the collective entity doctrine applied to Local 542, of the International
Union of Operating Engineers. See id. at 695 (giving facts). A subpoena duces te-
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labor union. 53 In doing so, the Court freed the collective entity doctrine
from its traditional moorings, as the doctrine had previously been applied
only to corporations. 54 Furthermore, the White Court signaled greater
sensitivity towards the white-collar rationale. 55
The expansion of the collective entity doctrine culminated in Bellis v.
United States.56 In Bellis, the Court considered whether a partner in a dis-
solved, three-member law firm could resist a subpoena duces tecum order-
ing him to produce the firm's documents. 5 7 The Court concluded that
cum demanding its constitution, by-laws and documents showing the collection of
work-permit fees, was served on the union related to a kickback scheme in public
work projects. See id. (stating facts); see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at 107 (providing
facts of White); Henning, supra note 38, at 827 (noting investigation regarded kick-
back scheme).
53. See White, 322 U.S. at 700-01 (applying collective entity to union). The test
the White Court formulated to determine whether the collective entity doctrine
applied to a subpoenaed organization is the "fairly impersonal test." See Henning,
supra note 16, at 418-19 (describing White test). The test asks:
[W] hether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular
type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its
membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent
the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to
embody their common or group interests only.
White, 322 U.S. at 701.
54. See White, 322 U.S. at 700-01 (recognizing that before White collective en-
tity doctrine applied only to corporations). The impact of White's expansion of the
collective entity doctrine was evident in circuit court decisions concluding that
White's analysis required the rejection of privilege claims asserted by large corpora-
tions. See, e.g., In reMal Bros. Contracting Co., 444 F.2d 615, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1971)
(conducting White analysis and concluding that defendants had all aspects of cor-
porate enterprise); United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789, 790-92 (2d Cir. 1963)
(applying White to limited liability partnership to determine that subpoena was
enforceable); United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1946) (stating
that White analysis required production of documents from limited partnership);
United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190, 209-10 (D.D.C. 1954) (employing White
analysis to determine that ship broker could not assert Fifth Amendment privi-
lege); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (apply-
ing White to partnership).
The Supreme Court similarly has extended White and applied the collective
entity doctrine to organizations other than labor unions. See, e.g., McPhaul v.
United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960) (applying White and extending collective
entity doctrine to Civil Rights Congress); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
371-72 (1951) (applying White and extending collective entity doctrine to Commu-
nist Party of Denver); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1950)
(applying White and extending collective entity doctrine to Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Committee).
55. See White, 322 U.S. at 700 (emphasizing importance of effective law en-
forcement). The Court in its oft-quoted support of the white-collar rationale said:
"Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records
and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be
impossible." Id. (citations omitted).
56. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
57. See Beltis, 417 U.S. at 85-87 (stating facts). The Court considered the
firm's dissolution irrelevant in its Fifth Amendment analysis. See id. at 97 (finding
dissolution not pertinent in Fifth Amendment analysis).
2001] NOTE
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the firm's dissolution did not give the partner greater Fifth Amendment
rights. 58 Moreover, the Court found that the partner acted in a represen-
tative capacity for the firm because he had possession of its documents.
5 9
Finally, in Bellis, the Court relied on the white-collar rationale to buttress
its holding.60 As a result, the Court surmised that given the Hale line of
cases, which had all expanded the collective entity doctrine, it was "well
settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate
records."
6 1
C. The Bear Court: Hard Times for the Collective Entity Doctrine
Despite the Court's belief that the Fifth Amendment issue was "well
settled," the collective entity doctrine was called into question in Fisher.
6 2
58. See id. at 88-89 (asserting dissolution does not give custodian of corporate
documents greater claim of Fifth Amendment privilege).
59. See id. at 97 (stating that partner holding subpoenaed partnership docu-
ments held documents in representative capacity).
60. See id. at 90 ("In view of the inescapable fact that an artificial entity can
only act to produce its records through its individual officers or agents, recogni-
tion of the individual's claim of privilege ... would ... largely frustrate legitimate
governmental regulation of such organizations.").
61. Id. at 100 (citations omitted).
62. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109 (1988) ("Fisher... em-
barked upon a new course of Fifth Amendment analysis."). Legal scholars also
concur that Fisher had an impact on traditional Fifth Amendment analysis. See
Nagareda, supra note 28, at 1593 (stating that Fisher "gutted Boyd's holding that the
Fifth Amendment flatly bars the compelled production of documents if their con-
tents will incriminate the producing person"); Neville S. Hedley, Comment, Who
Will Produce Corporate Documents? Case Comment of In reJohn Doe, 30 NEw ENG. L.
Rrv. 141,155 (1995) (arguing Fishersignaled new standard); ScottJennings, Anno-
tation, Availability of Sole Shareholder's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion to Resist Production of Corporation's Books and Records-Modern Status, 87 A.L.R.
FED. 177, 180 (1988) (stating that until Fisher, it had been uniformly held that
custodian's personal privilege against self-incrimination could never be asserted to
avoid production of corporate documents).
The Fisher case stemmed from an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") subpoena
served on two attorneys directing them to produce their respective clients' finan-
cial documents. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393-95 (providing facts). The two taxpayers
obtained papers from their accountants days after the IRS interviewed them and
transferred these documents to their attorneys. See id. at 394 (discussing transfer
of documents). The IRS learned of this transfer and thereafter served summons
on the attorneys. See id. (stating that IRS served attorneys). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard the appeal of one of the taxpayers
and held that the taxpayers never acquired a possessory interest in the documents
and that the attorney-client privilege did not apply. See United States v. Fisher, 500
F.2d 683, 691-93 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (stating holding), affd, 425 U.S. 391
(1976).
In a factually identical appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reached a contrary decision. See United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 447
(5th Cir. 1974) (considering taxpayers' Fifth Amendment claim to quash IRS sub-
poena), overruled by Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the financial documents were privileged, and because of the attor-
ney-client privilege, the taxpayer retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
documents. See Kasmir, 499 F.2d at 454-55 (giving holding); see also Fisher, 425 U.S.
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In a novel analysis, the Court considered whether the act-of producing
non-corporate documents would trigger the Fifth Amendment privilege,
regardless of the document's contents. 63 The Court concluded that the
physical act of producing such documents could convey information
about the document's existence, possession and authenticity, which could
be considered testimonial.
64
The Court consequently shifted the traditional Fifth Amendment
privilege analysis from a document's contents to the act of production.
65
at 395-96 (stating holding of Fifth Circuit). The Court granted certiorari in the
Fisher decision to resolve the circuit split. See Fisher v. United States, 420 U.S. 906
(1975) (granting certiorari).
Because the summonses were directed to the attorneys in Fisher, the taxpayers
asserted the attorney-client privilege to avoid complying with the IRS summons.
See Nagareda, supra note 28, at 1592 (discussing assertion of attorney-client privi-
lege). In order to circumvent the attorney-client privilege claim, the Court rea-
soned that the attorney-client privilege would protect the documents only to the
extent that the documents would have been protected if they remained in the
taxpayers' hands. See id. (analyzing Court's circumvention of attorney-client privi-
lege claim). For a general discussion of the attorney-client privilege issues raised
in Fisher and the impact Fisher had on the development of the attorney-client privi-
lege, see Brian Sheppard, Annotation, Views of United States Supreme Court As to Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 159 A.L.R. FED. 243, 255-58, 260-62 (2000).
After dismissing the attorney-client privilege claims, the Court examined
whether the subpoena would compel the taxpayers to make a testimonial and in-
criminating communication. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-05 (reasoning that attor-
ney-client privilege did not apply). The Court held that the subpoena would not
compel a testimonial and incriminating communication, because the subpoena
demanding production of the accountant's workpapers would not involve the tax-
payer's own testimonial communications. See id. at 408 (stating that Fifth Amend-
ment applies only when accused is personally compelled to make testimonial
communication that is incriminating). Given that the taxpayers, did not prepare
the documents sought through the IRS summons, the Court concluded the privi-
lege against self-incrimination was not applicable. See id. at 409 (finding account-
ant's preparation of documents precluded taxpayers' personal privilege claim).
63. For a further discussion of whether the act of producing documents could
trigger Fifth Amendment privilege, see infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
64. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (stating that act of production in response to
subpoena has communicative aspects separate from document's contents); see also
Henning, supra note 13, at 49-50 (discussing Fishers act-of-production analysis).
65. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The Fifth Amend-
ment basis for resisting production of a document pursuant to subpoena, the
Court tells us today, lies not in the document's contents, as we previously have
suggested, but in the tacit verification inherent in the act of production .... ");
Harris & Axelrod, supra note 32, at 218 (stating that Fisher shifted emphasis from
character of records sought to act-of-production). But see Alito, supra note 28, at
45-46 (arguing that act-of-production doctrine was not first conceived in Fisher, as
doctrine was first advanced in scholarly commentary on Boyd).
Following Fisher's departure from the Court's traditional examination of the
document's contents, scholars questioned the utility of the act-of- production doc-
trine. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 16, at 421-22 (criticizing Fisher as unnecessarily
complicated and irrelevant to real focus of grandjury investigations). Other schol-
ars also criticized the act-of-production doctrine for straying from the original text
and intent of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 28, at 1597-
1624 (arguing that Fisher misconceives nature of constitutional inquiry).
15
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Nevertheless, the majority, and Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,
stated that privacy considerations guided the Court's act-of-production
analysis. 66 The Court thus said that the act of production would be con-
sidered incriminating only if the subpoenaed documents were within the
Fifth Amendment's zone of privacy. 67 Nevertheless, Fisher cast doubt on
the collective entity doctrine because a custodian's act of producing cor-
porate documents could involve the custodian's personal and potentially
incriminating testimony. 68  In Fishers wake, lower courts split as to
whether the collective entity doctrine had survived. 69
D. The Second Coming: The Collective Entity Doctrine Is Born Again
In light of the split in the lower courts regarding the vitality of the
collective entity doctrine, the Supreme Court in Braswell considered
whether a corporate president could claim the act-of-production doctrine
shielded him from a subpoena demanding corporate documents.7 0 In
66. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 424 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that prece-
dent required expectation of privacy be considered). The Court established in
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-29 (1973), that the Fifth Amendment pro-
tected against the compelled production of testimonial evidence only if the person
resisting production had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the re-
quested evidence. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 425 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing
that Couch established consideration of degree to which paper holder has sought
to hold documents as private).
67. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 n.6 ("We hold ... no... Fifth Amendment claim
can prevail where ... there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy .... (quot-
ing Couch, 409 U.S. at 336)). Eight years after Fisher, the Court further expanded
the collective entity doctrine in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), where the
Court applied the act-of-production doctrine to quash a subpoena directed to a
sole proprietorship. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 (concluding that act of producing
documents was privileged).
68. See Timothy F. Sweeney, Comment, The Ffth Amendment Privilege and Collec-
tive Entities, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 295, 307-08 (1987) (stating that collective entity analy-
sis may be inapplicable if custodian's act of producing corporate documents is
sufficiently testimonial and incriminating).
69. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to recognize Fifth Amendment privilege regarding subpoena for corpo-
rate documents despite Court's holding in Fisher), In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-
W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 1986) (same), In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
771 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1985) (same), United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511,
1512-13 (9th Cir. 1984) (same), and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941,
946 (10th Cir. 1984) (same), with In reSealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1270 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (recognizing Fifth Amendment privilege regarding subpoena for corporate
documents based upon Fisher), In re Grand Jury No. 86-3, 816 F.2d 569, 572 (11th
Cir. 1987) (same), United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1238-41 (4th Cir. 1986)
(same), United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1986) (same), and In re
Grand Jury Matter, 768 F.2d 525, 527 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (same). Other
courts were so confused following Fisher that they applied both a pre-Fisher and a
Fisher analysis in the same case. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 19,
1980, 680 F.2d 327, 331-36 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying both pre-Fisher and Fisher anal-
ysis), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
70. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988) (stating issue).
Randy Braswell tried to quash a subpoena served on two corporations that he oper-
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considering this claim, the Court surveyed the Hale line of cases and con-
cluded that the collective entity doctrine remained valid despite Fisher.
7 1
In fact, the Court in Braswell did not try to reconcile the two converging
doctrines, but instead elevated the collective entity doctrine above the act-
of-production doctrine in cases where a subpoena demands corporate
documents. 7
2
In addition to resuscitating the collective entity doctrine, the Court
clarified to whom the collective entity doctrine applied.73 Employing a
fictional "agency theory" unique to the Fifth Amendment, the Braswell
Court determined that a person producing corporate documents acts as a
corporation's agent, rather than in a personal capacity.7 4 As a result, the
ated. See id. at 100-01 (providing facts). The district court denied his motion, rul-
ing that the collective entity doctrine prevented Braswell from asserting that his act
of producing the corporation's documents was protected under the Fifth Amend-
ment. See id. at 101-02 (discussing district court's holding). Relying on Bellis, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, and held that corporate custodians could not claim a Fifth
Amendment privilege. See id. at 102 (discussing court of appeal's holding). The
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding in a five to four decision
that created strange alliances. See id. at 100 (stating that Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., formed majority, while Kennedy,
Brennan, Marshall and Scalia,JJ., formed dissent). For a general discussion of how
the Supreme Court has split along peculiar lines in white-collar crime cases, see J.
Kelly Strader, Article, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGs L.J. 1199
(1999).
71. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 102, 109, 111-12 (noting that Fisher cited collective
entity decisions with approval and act-of-production privilege did not affect collec-
tive entity cases); see also Hedley, supra note 62, at 158 (stating that Braswell made
clear that collective entity doctrine remained good law). The dissent in Braswell
also agreed that the collective entity doctrine did not flounder after Fisher. See
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 124-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that collective entity
rule established in Hale and extended in White and Bellis remained valid).
In holding that the act-of-production doctrine did not affect the collective
entity doctrine, the Court limited Doe's holding allowing a sole proprietor to assert
the act of production privilege to only those business organizations. See Henning,
supra note 16, at 425 (stating that Court in Braswell limited Doe to its facts). One
possible justification for the limit placed on Doe is that a sole proprietor has a
greater expectation of privacy regarding documents. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 425
(Brennan, J., concurring) (saying expectation of privacy is consideration in Fifth
Amendment privilege claim). The implication of Braswell's confining the act-of-
production doctrine to a sole proprietor is that a person owning two businesses-
one a corporation and the other a sole proprietorship-will be able to assert the
privilege to avoid producing one set of documents, but will be forced to produce
the other set. See Henning, supra note 16, at 425 (explaining dichotomy created by
Braswell).
72. See Henning, supra note 16, at 423 (stating that Court elevated collective
entity doctrine above act-of-production doctrine privilege for documents of busi-
ness entities).
73. For a further discussion regarding to whom the collective entity doctrine
applies, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
74. See Braswel4 487 U.S. at 115 n.7 (holding, for Fifth Amendment purposes,
corporate custodian acts in representative capacity when producing corporate doc-
uments); cf David S. Rudolf & Thomas K. Maher, Column, Behind Closed Doors:
Former Employees May Assert Personal Fifth Amendment Right in Response to Subpoena
Seeking Corporate Documents, 23 CAMPION 71, 71 (1999) (stating that Braswell em-
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Court required all custodians to produce corporate documents without
resorting to the Fifth Amendment. 75 The BraswellCourt also relied on the
white-collar rationale to support its decision. 76 Sensitive to the pervasive
problem of white-collar crime, the Court reasoned that allowing a custo-
dian to rely on the act-of-production doctrine in order to avoid complying
with a subpoena would have a detrimental impact on the government's
investigative efforts.
77
Braswell thus resurrected the collective entity doctrine. 78 In doing so,
the Court concluded that a corporate custodian could not quash a sub-
poena demanding corporate documents. 79 Once again, the Court be-
lieved it had settled the Fifth Amendment privilege issue.8 0
ployed legal fiction when it held custodian was acting in corporate capacity when
producing documents). The Braswell majority criticized the dissent for failing to
recognize this Fifth Amendment agency principle because the dissent used tradi-
tional agency principles. See id. at 72 (criticizing dissent for failing to recognize
principle that custodian acts as representative when producing corporate docu-
ments). For a further discussion of how the Court employed this unique agency
principle, see Henning, supra note 16, at 423.
A scholar has criticized this use of agency theory as creating a dualistic custo-
dian because a custodian receiving a subpoena acts for the collective entity, while
the person who the government usually seeks to convict is that custodian. SeeJohn
M. Grogan, Jr., Fifth Amendment-The Act of Production Privilege: The Supreme Court's
Portrait ofa Dualistic Record Custodian, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701, 726 (1988)
(criticizing agency theory employed in Braswell).
75. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 109-10 ("[T]he custodian of corporate or entity
records holds those documents in a representative rather than a personal capac-
ity."); see also Hedley, supra note 62, at 158 (stating that Braswell extended reach of
representative capacity); Henning, supra note 16, at 425 (arguing that Braswell
adopted rule requiring all custodians of corporate documents to produce docu-
ments without resort to Fifth Amendment privilege). But see Braswell, 487 U.S. at
119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that majority opinion focused only on
employees).
76. For a further discussion of the weight the Court accorded the white-collar
rationale, see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
77. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 ("[R]ecognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege
on behalf of the records custodians of collective entities would have a detrimental
impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime'...."); see also
Henning, supra note 16, at 410 (arguing that white-collar rationale motivated Bras-
well decision). But see Braswell, 487 U.S. at 129 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing majority's belief that white-collar crime is most serious crime problem is
"overstated").
78. For a further discussion of Braswell's holding that the collective entity doc-
trine remained valid, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
79. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that Braswell
majority held Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to custodian's effort to quash sub-
poena for corporate documents).
80. See id. at 111 (claiming it is "'well settled'" that custodian of corporate
documents cannot claim privilege (quoting Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 100
(1947))). At the time of the Braswell decision, commentators viewed it as an at-
tempt to influence the independent counsel's investigation of the Iran-Contra af-
fair, as the independent counsel had been involved in litigation with an indicted
arms dealer resisting a subpoena for corporate records. See Al Kamen, Justices Bul-
wark Fight on White-Collar Crime; Suspects Required to Yield Some Records, WASH. POST,
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E. Lower Courts' Treatment of Whether the Collective Entity Doctrine Applies to
Former Employees
Following Braswell, lower courts generally applied the collective entity
doctrine to all subpoenas for corporate documents. 8 1 For example, in In
re Sealed Case,82 a former government employee asserted the act-of-produc-
tion privilege when trying to avoid producing self-incriminating govern-
ment documents. 83 Then-Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for
the unanimous United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, found that Braswell applied to a former employee's privilege claims.84
Moreover, the court highlighted the Fifth Amendment agency analysis
provided in Braswell, finding that by holding entity documents, a custodian
acts in a representative capacity.85
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that the collective entity doctrine required a former employee to pro-
duce corporate documents in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12,
1991.86 The former employee in this case argued that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in In re CrandJury Sub-
poenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983 ("Saxon Indus-
tries"), 87 should guide the Eleventh Circuit's decision.88 In Saxon
June 23, 1988, at A13 (claiming Braswell might aid Iran-Contra investigation); Stu-
art Taylor, Jr., Supreme Court Roundup; Rulings Curb Protection in White-Collar Crimes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1988, at A18 (same).
81. See Legal News-Notable News Developments in the Law: Circuit Split Roundup,
68 U.S.L.W. 2350 (Dec. 14, 1999) (discussing circuit split). For a further discus-
sion of the circuit split, see infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
82. 950 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
83. See In re Sealed Case, 950 F.2d at 737-38 (providing facts). Although the
documents subpoenaed in In re Sealed Case were government documents, the court
reasoned that the precedent set in the context of corporate documents applied by
analogy. See id. at 740 (analogizing between corporate and government docu-
ments). Therefore, the court employed the collective entity doctrine to consider
the custodian's claim. See id. at 739-41 (applying collective entity doctrine).
84. See id. at 740 (finding Braswell applies to former employees).
85. See id. (maintaining that corporate documents belong to corporation and
custodian holds documents only in agency capacity).
86. 957 F.2d 807 (11 th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). This case arose when a custo-
dian of bank documents, who had removed documents from the bank's premises,
resisted a subpoena on self-incrimination grounds. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 809 (stating facts). The district court denied the
custodian's privilege claim pursuant to Braswell. See id. at 808 (discussing procedu-
ral history). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
this ruling, reasoning that a formalistic view that Braswell applied only to current
employees would severely undermine Braswell. See id. at 809-10 (explaining that
formalistic view would undermine Braswell). Moreover, the court relied on the
"agency" rationale that a custodian implicitly holds corporate documents in a rep-
resentative capacity, in order to deny the former employee a Fifth Amendment
privilege. See id. at 810 (finding Braswell emphasized that corporate documents are
necessarily held in representative capacity).
87. 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983).
88. See Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 811 (stating that
defendant relied heavily on Saxon Industries).
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Industries, the Second Circuit held that a former employee could assert a
Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege to avoid producing corpo-
rate documents.8 9 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished its
case from Saxon Industries on the grounds that the defendant in Saxon In-
dustries stole copies of corporate documents and that the Second Circuit's
decision predated Braswell."
On the other hand, after Braswell, two circuits suggested that a former
employee might assert the act-of-production privilege.9 ' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took this position in Mora v.
United States,92 when it issued an order containing no reasoning.93 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit hinted in dicta that it
too would apply the act-of-production privilege to former employees in
United States v. McLaughlin.9
4
III. FACTs: THE EVENTS GIVING RISE TO IN RE THREE GRAND JURY
SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 29, 1999
In June, September and October of 1996, a grand jury, empanelled in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
issued subpoenas duces tecum to a corporation under criminal investiga-
89. See Saxon Indus., 722 F.2d at 986-87 (holding former employee acts in indi-
vidual capacity and may assert act-of-production privilege); see also Grand Jury Sub-
poena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 811 (providing holding of Saxon Industries).
90. See Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 811-12 (differenti-
ating between Saxon Industries and case before court).
91. For a further discussion of circuits allowing former employees to assert a
Fifth Amendment privilege, see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
92. 71 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995).
93. See Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 12
n.*, Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1143) (discuss-
ing Mora). In Mora, a motions panel of the Ninth Circuit followed Saxon Industries
in a brief order containing no reasoning or analysis. See Mora, 71 F.3d at 724 (fol-
lowing Saxon Industries and issuing order).
94. 126 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1997). The court in McLaughlin was primarily con-
cerned with the Braswell evidentiary rule, which precluded the Government from
making evidentiary use of a custodian's act-of-production against the custodian at
trial. See McLaughlin, 126 F.3d at 133 (discussing issue before court); Appellant's
Petition at 12 n.* (discussing issue in McLaughlin). Although the act of production
was not at issue, the court said a former employee "who produces purloined corpo-
rate documents is obviously not within the scope of the Braswell rule." McLaughlin,
126 F.3d at 133 n.2. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the Third Circuit would con-
clude that a former employee can assert an act-of-production privilege given then
Judge Becker's well reasoned concurrence in McLaughlin. See id. at 140-43
(Becker, J., concurring) (concurring in judgment). Then Judge Becker stated that
he would not follow traditional agency principles and would determine that a for-
mer employee could not assert a Fifth Amendment privilege. See id. at 143
(Becker, J., concurring) ("I am willing to accept such a stretch [of hornbook
agency law] because the alternative is to undermine either Braswell or Fifth
Amendmentjurisprudence .... ). For a further discussion of whether traditional
agency principles should be applied in determining a former employee's Fifth
Amendment privilege, see infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
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tion.95 After these subpoenas were issued, the corporation pled guilty and
agreed to cooperate in the Government's investigation.
9 6
The Government subsequently discovered that a former corporate
employee failed to produce corporate documents within the scope of the
three 1996 subpoenas. 97 As a result, in January, 1999, the Government
served subpoenas on twelve former employees whom it believed did not
fully comply with the prior subpoenas.98 All but three of the twelve for-
mer corporate employees produced responsive documents. 99 Doe I, Doe
II and Doe III (collectively, the "Does") asserted a Fifth Amendment privi-
lege rather than produce any documents. 10 0
The Does were employed with the corporation when the illegal activi-
ties occurred. 10 1 Moreover, Doe I and Doe II were corporate officers
when the subpoenas were served on the corporation and when the corpo-
95. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 174 (stating that grand jury was
investigating allegations of falsification of corporation's records and misapplica-
tion of corporate funds between 1993 and 1996). The June subpoena demanded
limited production of documents, whereas the September subpoena demanded
production of documents covering all matters under investigation. See id. at 175
(comparing subpoenas). The October subpoena supplemented the September
subpoena. See id. at 175 (describing scope of subpoenas); see also Appellant's Peti-
tion at 3 (same).
96. See Three GrandJuy Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 174 (saying corporation pled
guilty in spring of 1999 to making false entries in corporation's documents and
agreed to cooperate with ongoing investigation).
97. See id. at 175 (describing how government learned former corporate em-
ployee withheld incriminating corporate documents that were responsive to 1996
subpoenas).
98. See id. (stating that government issued subpoenas to twelve former corpo-
rate employees who government believed withheld documents responsive to 1996
subpoenas); see also Appellant's Petition at 4 (saying that after learning former
employee failed to produce responsive documents government served subpoenas
on former employees). The subpoenas specifically demanded, "'[a] ny and all
records, documents, instructions, memoranda, notes and papers (whether in com-
puterized or other form) in your care, custody, possession or control, that were
created during the course of, or in connection with, your employment at [the
corporation]."' Three Grand July Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175.
99. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175 (asserting that nine of for-
mer employees who received subpoena produced documents); see also Appellant's
Petition at 4 (noting that most of former employees fully complied with
subpoenas).
100. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175 (declaring that appellees
were only former corporate employees asserting Fifth Amendment privilege). Be-
tween the time that the court decided this appeal on September 7, 1999 and the
Government's Petition for Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc filed on November 22,
1999, Doe II produced the subpoenaed documents to the corporation, and the
corporation then produced the documents to the Government. See Appellant's
Petition at 3, n.** (stating that Doe II produced documents). Doe II did so in
exchange for the corporation's agreeing to resume payments under his severance
agreement; these payments had been withheld when he refused to comply with the
Government's January, 1999 subpoena. See id. (noting Doe II had severance agree-
ment reinstated).
101. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 174 (noting facts); see also Ap-
pellant's Petition at 3 (same).
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ration responded to them. 10 2 Doe I did not leave the corporation's em-
ploy until five months after the Government served its last subpoena on
the corporation. l0 3 When Doe II resigned, about a year following the last
subpoena, he signed a severance agreement binding him to cooperate
with the corporation in the ongoing investigation and "any investigation to
follow."1 0 4 Doe III resigned shortly after the June, 1996 subpoena had
been served on the corporation. 10 5 Similar to Doe II, Doe III promised in
a severance agreement to cooperate with "any investigation.' 1 6
When the Does refused to produce documents responsive to the Janu-
ary, 1999 subpoena, the Government filed a sealed motion in district court
to compel production. 10 7 The Government argued that the responsive
documents were corporate documents and that the Does remained corpo-
rate custodians after having left the corporation's employ.' 0 8 Accordingly,
it argued that the Does could not successfully invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment because of Braswell.10 9 The Does countered that, under Fisher, their
act of production would be compelled, testimonial and incriminating. 11 0
Thus, the Does argued, if the court required them to comply with the
subpoena, it would mandate the equivalent of forced testimony as to the
existence, unlawful possession or authenticity of the documents."1
102. See Three GrandJury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175 (discussing 1996 subpoe-
nas). In addition to being employed by the corporation when it was served with
the 1996 subpoenas, Doe I and Doe II received actual notice of the subpoenas and
assisted in the corporation's subpoena compliance. See id. (discussing facts). For
example, an affidavit from the corporation's attorney suggests that he met with
Doe I and Doe II and asked them to produce some responsive documents; Doe I
and Doe II produced some documents following this request. See id. (discussing
limited production of documents); see also Appellant's Petition at 3-4 (describing
Doe I's production of some subpoenaed documents).
103. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175 (stating that Doe I left
employment with corporation in March of 1997); see also Appellant's Petition at 3
(same).
104. See Three GrandJury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175 (discussing Doe II's sever-
ance agreement); see also Appellant's Petition at 3 (stating that Doe II produced
responsive documents in exchange for corporation's resumption of his severance
payments).
105. See Three GrandJury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175, 180 n.3 (saying Doe III
resigned from corporation in mid-July, 1996); Appellant's Petition at 3 (stating
that Doe III resigned "shortly after" first subpoena was served on corporation).
106. See Three GrandJuy Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175 (describing Doe III's sever-
ance agreement); see also Appellant's Petition at 3 (stating that Doe III agreed in
severance agreement to cooperate with corporation "in any criminal
investigation").
107. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 176 (outlining Government
action to compel production); see also Appellant's Petition at 3 (same).
108. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 176 (summarizing Govern-
ment's argument that Does remained corporate custodians).
109. See id. (outlining Government's argument that Braswell precluded Does'
Fifth Amendment privilege claim); see also Appellant's Petition at 4 (same).
110. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 176 (providing Does' opposing
arguments).
111. See id. (outlining Does' arguments).
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In response, the district court denied the Government's motion to
compel the Does to produce any corporate documents.11 2 In reaching
this decision, the district court first relied on the Second Circuit's Saxon
Industries decision.1 1 3 Next, the district court relied on the Fifth Amend-
ment act-of-production doctrine. 114 Finally, the district court stated that
regardless of Saxon Industries, the Fifth Amendment is entitled to height-
ened deference whenever a former employee is required to produce cor-
porate documents. 115 Thus, the district court held that the three former
corporate employees had a Fifth Amendment act-of-production privi-
lege. 1 16 The Second Circuit affirmed this ruling that a former employee
of a corporation may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege and thus may
quash a subpoena demanding corporate documents.
17
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit began by
reviewing Supreme Court precedent on both the collective entity and act-
of-production doctrines. 118 Next, the court addressed the Government's
argument that Doe II's and Doe III's severance agreements created a con-
tinuing agency relationship between them and the corporation. 119 The
112. See id. (stating Judge Sprizzo denied Government's motion).
113. See id. (citing Saxon Industries). For a further discussion of the district
court's decision in Saxon Industries, see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
114. See Three GrandJury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 176 (relying on Fisherand Doe).
For a further discussion of the act-of-production doctrine, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
115. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 176 (stating that Fifth Amend-
rihent is at its height when former employee is served with subpoena for corporate
documents). In reaching his ruling, which was issued from the bench, Judge
Sprizzo said that he would have ruled as he did even if Saxon Industries "'were not
even on the books.'" Id. Judge Sprizzo thus said, "the 'question of testimonial
incrimination is at its height when [the document] is produced by a person who is
no longer employed by the corporation, because there is an inference that [he]
may have stolen [it]."' Id. Judge Sprizzo further stated that "'the act of testimo-
nial [production] on behalf of a person who is no longer with the corporation is
self-incrimination in its classic sense of the word, and the Constitution does not
permit it.'" Id.
116. See id. (providing district court's holding); see also Appellant's Petition at
4 (same).
117. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 174 (holding Fifth Amend-
ment shields former employees from subpoena for corporate documents); see also
Appellant's Petition at 4-5 (stating Second Circuit's holding). According to the
Second Circuit's Office of the Clerk, the court denied the Government's Petition
for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc on February 4, 2000.
118. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 177-79 (reviewing Supreme
Court precedent).
119. See id. at 180 (outlining Government's argument that agency relationship
continued because of severance agreements). For a further discussion of agency
principles in Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, see Self-Incrimination: Act of Production Priv-
ilege Extends to Former Employees, 68 U.S.L.W. 1164 (Sept. 28, 1999).
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court, however, found no legal basis for interpreting the severance agree-
ments as giving rise to such a relationship.
1 2 0
Then the Second Circuit addressed the Government's contention
that Saxon Industries no longer remained good law following Braswell.12 1
The Three GrandJury Subpoenas court concluded that Braswell was limited to
current employees, and therefore, did not implicate Saxon Industries.
12 2
Furthermore, the court noted the factual framework underlying Braswell
was not present, as the corporate custodian in Braswell had held the docu-
ments in a representative capacity. 123 As a result, the Second Circuit
found that the Does acted in their personal capacities when possessing the
documents.' 
24
The Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court also found the Government
"overstate [d]" its argument that adhering to Saxon Industries would under-
mine effective law enforcement. 125 The court reasoned that this concern
was misplaced because the Government could have obtained the docu-
ments by personally serving the Does before they left the corporation's
employ. 126 Moreover, the court concluded that the Government could
still get the documents through a search warrant or by granting the Does
120. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 180 (saying there is no basis in
law to interpret severance agreement as continuing agency relationship between
former employees and former employer). The court further found that although
the agreements required Doe II and Doe III to cooperate with "any future investi-
gation," Doe II and Doe III did not waive their Fifth Amendment rights. See id. at
180 (finding Doe II and Doe III did not waive Fifth Amendment rights through
severance agreements).
121. See id. (discussing Government's argument that Saxon Industries was no
longer good law). '
122. See id. at 181 (stating that Braswell does not affect Second Circuit's hold-
ing in Saxon Industries). For a further discussion of Saxon Industries, see supra notes
84-87 and accompanying text. The Government argued that Saxon Industries was
no longer valid law following Braswell because: (1) Braswell held that the collective
entity doctrine overcomes the act-of-production doctrine whenever the Govern-
ment subpoenas corporate documents; (2) Braswell relied on Bellis and Wheeler so
that Braswell's holding logically extends to former employees; and (3) the eviden-
tiary privilege created in Braswell protects a former employee from the personal
consequences of producing corporate documents. See id. at 180-81 (outlining Gov-
ernment's arguments). See generally Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing &
Rehearing En Banc at 7-11, Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999)
(No. 99-1143) (arguing that Braswell precludes former employee from asserting
Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid producing corporate documents).
123. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 181 ("The rule in Braswell was
predicated on the rationale that corporate custodians hold and produce docu-
ments only in a representational capacity .... In the absence of ... an agency
relationship, the foundation upon which Braswell rests ... is removed.").
124. See id. (stating that when former employee produces documents "he can-
not be acting in anything other than his personal capacity").
125. See id. at 182 (claiming Government overstated argument that decision
could undermine effective law enforcement).
126. See id. at 182 n.4 (asserting that Government should have served Does
while they were active employees).
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statutory immunity for their act of production. 127 The court thus con-
cluded that Saxon Industries supported its holding that the Does could
quash the subpoena.1 28 Finally, the court stated that the Government's
concern that this would create an incentive for corporate custodians to
partake in obstructionist behavior, was a "policy consideration [ ]" not rel-
evant in a Fifth Amendment analysis. 129 Furthermore, the court stated
that the burden placed on law enforcement efforts was inherent in the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
130
B. Dissent
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Cabranes first chastised the majority for
adhering to Saxon Industries despite the Supreme Court's Braswell deci-
sion. 13 1 Second, the dissent argued that, even if Braswell did not overrule
Saxon Industries, the Does' Fifth Amendment claim was factually different
than Saxon Industries.132 Third, the dissent criticized the majority's appli-
cation of traditional agency theories to determine whether the Does fell
outside of the collective entity doctrine. 33 Finally, the dissent invoked the
white-collar rationale, arguing that the court's decision would allow a cus-
todian possessing corporate documents to engage in obstructionist
behavior. 13
4
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The court's reasoning in Three Grand Jury Subpoenas was problematic
in five respects.135 First, the court overemphasized traditional notions of
agency law when determining that the Does acted in a representative ca-
pacity.136 Second, the court should have relied on Braswel, rather than on
Saxon Industries.'3 7 Third, the court strayed from Supreme Court prece-
dent in rejecting the white-collar rationale as a mere "policy considera-
127. See id. at 182-83 (discussing grant of statutory immunity and use of search
warrant to get documents).
128. See id. (comparing analysis in Saxon Industries to Fifth Amendment privi-
lege Does asserted).
129. See id. at 183 (finding greater burden on law enforcement is "policy
consideration [ ]").
130. See id. (concluding that greater burden on law enforcement is inherent
in Fifth Amendment privilege).
131. See id. at 186 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for not fol-
lowing Supreme Court precedent).
132. See id. (differentiating Saxon Industries and Three Grand Jury Subpoenas).
133. See id. at 186 n.4 (finding traditional agency principles not applicable).
134. See id. at 187 (discussing impact of majority opinion on effective law
enforcement).
135. For a further discussion of ways the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court
erred, see infra notes 136-208 and accompanying text.
136. For a further discussion of how the court mistakenly applied traditional
agency law, see infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
137. For a further discussion of why the court should not have relied on Saxon
Industries, see infra notes 164-78 and accompanying text.
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tion [ ].,,138 Fourth, the court overlooked the fact that expectation of
privacy principles suggest that the Does should have produced the docu-
ments.13 9 Finally, the court gave too much weight to its belief that the
Government could have obtained the documents through other means.
140
A. Applying Traditional Agency Law
The Second Circuit relied on traditional notions of agency law to de-
termine that, because the Does were former employees, they no longer
acted in a representative capacity when possessing corporate docu-
ments. 14' This reliance on traditional agency law is contrary to Supreme
Court precedent and the Fifth Amendment agency rule enunciated in
Braswel. 142
Braswell and the other collective entity line of cases suggest that the
Second Circuit should have denied the Does' Fifth Amendment claims.
143
In Wheeler, for instance, former employees of a dissolved corporation as-
serted a Fifth Amendment privilege claim in order to avoid producing cor-
porate documents. 144 The Court held that the corporation's dissolution
was immaterial; thus, the defendants, although technically former officers,
were still required to comply with a subpoena for corporate documents.
145
The court should have followed Wheeler to preclude the Does from assert-
ing a Fifth Amendment privilege because the Braswell Court found that the
collective entity line of cases remained valid.
146
The court overlooked not only Wheeler, but also Bellis, another Su-
preme Court decision that precluded former employees from asserting a
138. For a further discussion of the court's mischaracterization of the white-
collar rationale, see infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
139. For a further discussion of how the court applied expectation of privacy
principles, see infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
140. For a further discussion of why the remaining remedies are inadequate,
see infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
141. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1999) (apply-
ing traditional agency law). For a further discussion of the court's use of tradi-
tional agency law, see supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
142. For a further discussion of how the court's use of traditional agency law
was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 143-63 and accompany-
ing text.
143. For a further discussion of why Braswell and other collective entity cases
suggest the Does should have been denied a Fifth Amendment privilege, see infra
notes 144-63 and accompanying text.
144. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1913) (stating facts).
145. See id. at 488 (holding "dissolution ... is immaterial"). For a further
discussion of Wheeler, see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
146. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 185-86 n.2 (Cabranes, J., dis-
senting) (arguing Wheeler remains valid and is applicable to former employees'
privilege claims); cf. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109 (1988) (stating
Fisher did not make collective entity doctrine "obsolete"). But see Three Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 181-82 (finding Wheeler inapplicable as it was decided before
Court "'jettisoned reliance on the visitorial powers of the State over corporations"'
(quoting Braswell, 487 U.S. at 108)).
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Fifth Amendment privilege. 147 The court should have relied on Bellis to
determine the Does had no Fifth Amendment privilege because Braswell
relied heavily on Bellis to deny Braswell's privilege claim.1 48 The Braswell
Court's reliance on Bellis also indicates that Braswell's reasoning was not
limited to current employees. 149 Despite the Supreme Court case law
weighing against the Does, only Judge Cabranes, in his dissent, found it
"obvious[ ]" that the court "must apply Supreme Court precedent."' 5 0
The court also contravened the Fifth Amendment agency rule devel-
oped in Braswell.151 In Braswell, the Court developed an agency formula
that stretched hornbook law when it found a person producing corporate
documents acts as a corporation's agent, rather than in a personal capac-
ity. 5 2 In his Braswell dissent, Justice Kennedy chided the Court for misap-
plying traditional agency law to reach this conclusion.1 53 Yet, the Braswell
Court stretched traditional agency law because not doing so would have
undermined Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and the entire collective en-
tity doctrine.' 54 The contrast between the Braswell majority's expansion of
agency principles and the dissent's refusal to do so is evident in the termi-
• nology used by each side. 155 For example, the Braswell majority spoke of
147. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 184 n.1, 185-86 n.2 (Cabranes,
J., dissenting) (finding Bellis was dispositive of former employees' privilege claims).
148. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 102, 108, 111 n.4, 112-13 (citing BeIis with ap-
proval); see also Henning, supra note 16, at 423 (arguing Braswell relied on Bellis to
elevate collective entity doctrine above act-of-production doctrine).
149. See generally Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing & Rehearing En
Banc at 7, Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1143)
(arguing that Court's reliance on Bellis indicates Braswell not confined to current
employees). For a further discussion of the facts of Bellis, see supra notes 56-60 and
accompanying text.
150. Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 186 (Cabranes,J., dissenting).
151. For a further discussion of the agency rule adopted in BrasweU, see supra
notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
152. Cf United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 141 (3d Cir. 1997)
(Becker, J., concurring) ("To conclude that [the corporate custodian] acted
within his agency (as I ultimately do), we must therefore look beyond hornbook
agency law."). But see Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 180-81, 183 (relying
on traditional agency principles to assess former employees' privilege claims). In a
concurring opinion in McLaughlin, then-Judge Becker provided a thoughtful and
provocative analysis as to why traditional agency principles should not be applied
to a custodian's Fifth Amendment privilege claim after Braswell. See generally Mc-
Laughlin, 126 F.3d at 140-43 (Becker, J., concurring) (discussing implications of
applying traditional agency principles to custodian's privilege claim).
153. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The majority
gives the corporate agent fiction a weight it simply cannot bear."); see also Three
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 186 n.4 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Justice Kennedy criticized Braswell majority for "allegedly misapplying common law
principles of agency").
154. See McLaughlin, 126 F.3d at 143 (Becker, J., concurring) (explaining that
not stretching traditional agency law will undermine Braswell or Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence).
155. For a further discussion of the majority and dissent's terminology in Bras-
well, see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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whether "individuals" and "custodians" holding corporate documents
could assert a Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege. 1 56 On the
other hand, only Justice Kennedy's dissent makes repeated reference to
"employees."15 7
Nevertheless, the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court resorted to tradi-
tional agency theory and restricted the scope of Braswell to current "em-
ployees."' 58 The Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court should have followed
the majority's formula in Braswell and addressed whether the Does were
"individuals" who were "custodians" possessing corporate documents.
159
Under this analysis, the court would likely have denied the Does a Fifth
Amendment privilege. 160 Instead, the court adopted Justice Kennedy's
traditional agency approach and focused on the Does as "employees."1 6 1
In conclusion, the Three Grand Juiy Subpoenas court failed to adhere to Bras-
156. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 100 ("This case presents the question whether
the custodian of corporate records may resist a subpoena .... (emphasis added));
id. at 108-09 (stating that "[t]he plain mandate ... is that.., the individual in his
capacity as a custodian [and] a corporate custodian such as [Braswell] may not resist
a subpoena for corporate records .... (emphasis added)); id. at 109-10 ("[The
Court has consistently recognized that the custodian of corporate or entity records
holds those documents in a representative rather than a personal capacity." (em-
phasis added)); id. at 111 n.4 ("[A]n individual cannot rely upon the privilege to
avoid producing the records of a collective entity ...." (quoting Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974) (emphasis added)); id. at 113 ("[O]ne in control of
the records of an artificial organization undertakes an obligation with respect to
those records foreclosing any exercise of his privilege" (citing Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 429-30 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
157. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court today
denies an individual his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
order to vindicate the rule that a collective entity which employs him has no such
privilege itself." (emphasis added)); id. at 120 (KennedyJ., dissenting) ("The ma-
jority's apparent reasoning is that collective entities have no privilege and so their
employees must have none either." (emphasis added)); id. at 130 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he Court employs the fiction that personal incrimination of the em-
ployee is neither sought by the Government nor cognizable by the law." (emphasis
added)).
158. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 178-79 ("In Braswell, the Court
addressed the question of whether a current corporate employee could claim a
Fifth Amendment act of production privilege .... The question presented by this
appeal, however, is different from that presented in Braswell. It is whether former
employees ... may claim an act of production privilege .... ).
159. For a further discussion of the reasoning and terminology the Braswell
majority employed, see supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
160. Cf Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 186 n.4 (Cabranes, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that analysis is whether individual acts in representative capacity
when holding and producing corporate documents); United States v. McLaughlin,
126 F.3d 130, 143 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, J., concurring) (rejecting traditional
agency approach and finding custodian may not resist subpoena); In re Sealed
Case, 950 F.2d 736, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding former custodian may not assert
act-of-production privilege because custodian acts in agency capacity when holding
corporate documents).
161. For a further discussion of how the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court
adopted the reasoning ofJustice Kennedy's Braswell dissent, see supra note 158 and
accompanying text.
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wells holding that traditional agency principles do not determine a custo-
dian's Fifth Amendment privilege claim. 162 Thus, the court bucked
principles of American jurisprudence by following Justice Kennedy's Bras-
well dissent rather than the majority's holding.1 63
B. Following Saxon Industries
The Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court overemphasized that Saxon In-
dustries remained valid law following Braswell and that Saxon Industries was
factually on point. 164 Saxon Industries was decided against the "uncertain
backdrop" of whether the collective entity doctrine survived Fisher.'65 Be-
cause Braswell had yet to elevate the collective entity doctrine above the
act-of-production analysis when a subpoena demands corporate docu-
ments, the Saxon Industries court had applied the act-of-production doc-
trine to a former employee's privilege claim. 16 6 Following the Second
Circuit's decision in Saxon Industries, however, Braswell held that the collec-
tive entity doctrine remained valid. 167 The Three Grand Juy Subpoenas
court should have recognized that Braswell implicitly overruled Saxon In-
dustries by determining that Fishers act-of-production analysis was inappli-
cable to a subpoena demanding corporate documents. 168
162. Compare Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 n.7 (finding agency principle unique to
Fifth Amendment precludes employee from asserting act-of-production privilege),
with Three GrandJury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 179-80 (employing traditional agency
law and determining that former employee may assert privilege because former
employee is no longer corporate agent).
163. Cf Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 186 (Cabranes, J., dissenting)
("[W] e obviously must apply Supreme Court precedent, even when it conflicts with
our own, earlier authority . . ").
164. For a further discussion of how the court erred in relying on Saxon Indus-
tries, see infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.
165. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and
June 22, 1983 ("Saxon Industries"), 722 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that
court is deciding whether act-of-production privilege applies to former employee
against "uncertain backdrop"); cf. Hedley, supra note 62, at 158 (arguing that
courts were uncertain as to collective entity doctrine's vitality because of Fisher).
Thus, before Braswell, circuits were split as to whether current employees could
invoke the act-of-production privilege. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 771
F.2d 143, 147-48 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (refusing to recognize act-of-produc-
tion privilege with respect to corporate documents), with United States v. Sancetta,
788 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing representative of collective entity may
successfully assert act of production is incriminating).
166. See Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d at 987 (holding former employee may assert
act-of-production privilege). For a further discussion of how Braswell elevated the
collective entity doctrine above the act-of-production doctrine, see supra note 72
and accompanying text.
167. For a further discussion of Braswell's holding that the collective entity
doctrine remained valid despite Fisher, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
168. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 186 (Cabranes, J., dissenting)
(stating that Braswell overruled Saxon Industries); see also Appellant's Petition for
Panel Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 12-13, Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191
F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1143) (arguing Braswell cast doubt on whether
Saxon Industries remained good law).
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Even though the court concluded that Saxon Industries survived, the
court should still have factually distinguished Three Grand Jury Subpoenas
from Saxon Industries.1 69 First, the former employee in Saxon Industries had
dissociated himself from the corporation more than a year before the cor-
poration was served with a subpoena demanding production of corporate
documents. 171 The Does, however, left the corporation's employ after the
corporation had been served. 1 7 1
Second, the Saxon Industries court was primarily concerned that the
former officer's act of producing corporate documents would establish
that he misappropriated documents because he knew of their incriminat-
ing contents. 172 This concern should not be applied to the Does, as Bras-
well alleviated it by establishing an evidentiary privilege that would have
precluded the Government from making evidentiary use of the Does' act
of production.' 73
Finally, Saxon Industries arose when the Government demanded a for-
mer employee, who absconded with copies of corporate documents, pro-
duce those copies although the Government already possessed the
originals. 174 The Government, therefore, sought to discover what docu-
ments the former employee believed to be "'smoking gun' evidence of his
guilt."' 75 Thus, the Saxon Industries court could not have relied on the
white-collar rationale, as concern about the impact of the court's decision
on the Government's prosecutory authority would have been mis-
placed. 176 Notwithstanding, the white-collar rationale would be applica-
ble in Three Grand Jury Subpoenas.177 Here, the issue was not whether the
169. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807,
811-12 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (differentiating Saxon Industries from privi-
lege claim of former employee).
170. See Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d at 982 (stating that former employee left
corporation about one year before Government served subpoena on corporation),
171. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 175 (noting that Does were
employed with corporation at time Government served 1996 subpoenas).
172. See Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d at 987 (stating that Government would use
former employee's act-of-production to argue employee removed documents be-
cause they were evidence of guilt); see also Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991,
957 F.2d at 811-12 (explaining court's concern in Saxon Industries was that former
employee's act of production would establish that he misappropriated
documents).
173. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117-18 (1988) (establishing
evidentiary privilege); see also Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at
811-12 (stating that Braswells evidentiary privilege alleviated concern of Saxon In-
dustries court).
174. See Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d at 983 (explaining that former employee
held duplicates of corporate documents that Government already possessed).
175. Cf id. at 987 (discussing former employee's argument that Government
already had documents and that act-of-production would reveal "'smoking-gun'
evidence).
176. Cf id. at 982-83 (describing how Government subpoenaed copies of doc-
uments although it already possessed originals).
177. See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173, 184 (2d Cir. 1999)
(Cabranes, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority ignored Supreme Court prece-
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Government could be guided to copies of documents that, the Govern-
ment already possessed, but rather whether the Government could access
the documents at all.
178
C. The White-Collar Rationale
The Supreme Court has recognized the primacy of the white-collar
rationale in its collective entity analysis. 179 Thus, Three Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas inappropriately deemed the white-collar rationale a "policy considera-
tion[ ].,180 In so characterizing the white-collar rationale, the Three Grand
Jury Subpoenas court ignored the very policy undergirding the collective
entity doctrine.18 ' In 1911, the Wilson Court stated that the white-collar
rationale must be taken into account, otherwise the government's power
to compel production of corporate documents "would seriously be embar-
rassed, if not wholly defeated.'1 8 2 Moreover, the Court has adhered to the
white-collar rationale from Wilson to Braswell.18 3 Therefore, the Three
Grand Jury Subpoenas court ignored Supreme Court acceptance of the
white-collar rationale by relegating it to a mere policy consideration. 18 4
dent in creating incentive for corporate employees and other agents to abscond
with subpoenaed documents); id. at 187 (CabranesJ., dissenting) (criticizing ma-
jority for not applying white-collar rationale); cf Appellant's Petition for Panel Re-
hearing & Rehearing En Banc at 14, Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F,3d 173 (2d
Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1143) (arguing that court overlooked policies underlying col-
lective entity doctrine).
178. Cf Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 187 (Cabranes,J., dissenting)
(stating that court denied Government access to corporate documents).
179. For a further discussion of the weight the Court has accorded the white-
collar rationale, see supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text and supra notes 76-
77 and accompanying text.
180. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 183 (classifying greater burden
court's decision will place on law enforcement as "policy consideration [ ]").
181. See Appellant's Petition at 14 (arguing that court failed to properly take
into account white-collar rationale).
182. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911).
183. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115-16 (1988) (relying on
white-collar rationale); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) (same);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944) (same); Wheeler v. United States,
226 U.S. 478, 488 (1913) (same); see also Henning, supra note 38, at 828 (stating
that Hale, White and Braswell support white-collar rationale).
Outside of the collective entity doctrine, the Supreme Court has also demon-
strated its willingness to sacrifice an individual's protection against self-incrimina-
tion when the Court perceives a substantial threat to law enforcement efforts. See
Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 557 (1990) (holding
legal custodian of child could not invoke Fifth Amendment to resist court order to
produce child for physical exam); Lionel E. Pashkoff, The Fifth Amendment and Im-
munity in Securities & Exchange Commission Investigations, 88 A.B.A. J. 503, 503
(1998) (describing Court's willingness to sacrifice individual protections).
184. For a further discussion of the court's mischaracterization of the white-
collar rationale as a policy concern, see supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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D. Expectation of Privacy Principles
Although the Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court should not have turned
to the act-of-production doctrine, by doing so, the court erred in its appli-
cation. 18 5 Expectation of privacy principles are not normally applied to
the Fifth Amendment. 186 Nevertheless, both the majority and Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Fisher concluded that privacy considerations
guide an act-of-production analysis.' 8 7 Thus, an act of production may be
incriminating only if the documents are within a zone of privacy. 188
The Does, however, did not hold the documents within such a recog-
nized zone of privacy. 189 First, as the Saxon Industries court stated, corpo-
rate documents are not converted into personal property merely because a
custodian is no longer employed with a corporation. 19 Thus, the Does
held corporate property when holding the documents. 19 Second, Doe II
and Doe III could not have established a reasonable expectation of privacy
given that both agreed to cooperate in future investigations. 192 Finally,
the Does could not assert a heightened privacy simply because the Does
moved the documents from the corporation to their homes; before Three
Grand Jury Subpoenas, the Second Circuit had held that such an act does
not increase privacy expectations. 193 Thus, the court misapplied Fisher's
185. For a further discussion of how the court misapplied the act-of-produc-
tion doctrine, see infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
186. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (stating that Fifth
Amendment "applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial
communication that is incriminating" (emphasis added)); see also Michael Mello &
Paul Perkins, Ted Kaczynski's Diary, 22 VT. L. REv. 83, 93 (1997) (arguing that mod-
em Fifth Amendment jurisprudence focuses on compulsion and not on privacy);
Daniel E. Will, Note, "Dear Diary-Can You Be Used Against Me?": The Fifth Amend-
ment and Diaries, 35 B.C. L. REv. 965, 968 (1994) (asserting that Fisher and Doe
limited Fifth Amendment protection of privacy).
187. For a further discussion of the role privacy considerations played in
Fisher, see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
188. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 423 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Unless those
materials are such as to come within the zone of privacy recognized by the [Fifth]
Amendment, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not protect
against their production.").
189. For a further discussion of how the Does held the documents outside the
zone of privacy, see infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
190. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and
June 22, 1983 ("Saxon Industries"), 722 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissing as
"frivolous" former custodian's claim that documents became personal papers be-
cause he dissociated himself from corporation).
191. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 183, 186 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999)
(Cabranes, J., dissenting) (stating that documents belonged to corporation).
192. See id. at 186 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Does continued to
act on corporation's behalf because of.severance agreements).
193. See United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
moving corporate documents from corporation to home does not translate into
heightened privacy).
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act-of-production analysis by not concluding that the subpoenaed docu-
ments were outside the zone of privacy. 194
E. Leaving the Government Without an Adequate Remedy
The Three Grand Jury Subpoenas court misapplied the remedies that it
believed would allow the Government to obtain the documents. 19 5 The
court mistakenly concluded that the Government could rely on a search
warrant to get the documents. 19 6 In order to obtain a search warrant,
however, the Government must meet the Fourth Amendment's particular-
ity requirement. 19 7 The court, therefore, had to presuppose that the Gov-
ernment was both aware of the documents' existence and knew where the
documents could be found. 198 The Government will not likely have such
knowledge in most white-collar investigations, as corporate documents
often are maintained in many forms and locations.199 Moreover, the
court assumed that the Government could establish the probable cause
necessary to obtain a search warrant. 20 0
Furthermore, the court mistakenly concluded that the Government
could have granted the Does statutory immunity for their act-of-produc-
tion.20 1 This remedy is contrary to Braswell, which concluded statutory im-
194. For a further discussion of court's misapplication of zone of privacy prin-
ciples, see supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
195. For a further discussion of why the court left the Government with inef-
fective remedies, see infra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.
196. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 183 (finding Government
could compel production through search warrant). For a further discussion of
why the Government could not obtain a search warrant, see infra notes 197-200
and accompanying text.
197. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1V ("Warrants shall ... particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."). For examples
of Supreme Court and Second Circuit case law interpreting the particularity re-
quirement, see Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir. 2000);
United States v. Bianco, 988 F.2d 1112, 1115-16 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. George,
975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992); and United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d
Cir. 1987). For a further discussion of the Fourth Amendment, see 68 AM.JUR. 2D
Searches and Seizures § 16 (2000).
198, See Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 13
n.**, Three GrandJury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1143) (argu-
ing court presupposed that Government could meet particularity requirement).
199. Cf Rakoff, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing nature of corporate
documents).
200. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation .... ); see also Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (stating that to conduct search police need probable
cause, which exists when "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that suspect is engaged
in criminal activity).
201. For a further discussion of why the court wrongly decided that the Gov-
ernment could grant the Does statutory immunity, see infra note 202 and accompa-
nying text.
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munity was an unrealistic alternative because the Government would need
to show that any evidence it might use at trial was not the direct or deriva-
tive product of the immunity.20 2 Moreover, granting statutory immunity is
less of an option now than when Braswell was decided, given the Court's
decision in United States v. Hubbell,2° 3 which established an exceptionally
broad interpretation of statutory immunity.
2 °4
Moreover, the court incorrectly suggested that the Government sim-
ply could have prevented the Does from asserting a Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege if the Government had separately served both the corporation and
the Does while they were still employees. 20 5 The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly said that when the Government serves a subpoena on either a
corporation or an employee, both are bound to comply.20 6 Furthermore,
the court suggested this remedy even though Doe I and Doe II received
actual notice of the 1996 subpoenas while still employed. 20 7 This fact is
highly relevant because no legal basis before the Three Grand Juy Subpoenas
decision distinguished between a corporate custodian personally served
and a corporate custodian receiving actual notice of a subpoena. 20 8
VI. IMPACT
The Three Grand Jury Subpoenas decision has the potential to alter the
landscape of the investigation and prosecution of white-collar crime. 20 9
This decision is the first major opinion that confines Braswell to current
202. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 116-17 (1988) (finding Govern-
ment cannot obtain documents through grant of statutory immunity because it
would impose "heavy burden" on Government to show that any evidence was not
direct or derivative product of immunity); see also Appellant's Petition at 13 n.**
(criticizing court for determining Government could grant statutory immunity).
203. 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
204. See Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2040-44 (providing broad interpretation of act-
of-production immunity). For a further discussion of Hubbell, see Scott A.
Edelman & Andrew E. Tomback, Developing the 'Act of Production'Doctrine, N.Y. LJ.,
July 6, 2000, at Al.
205. For a further discussion of why the court erred in concluding that the
Does should have been personally served, see infra notes 206-08 and accompanying
text.
206. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 108-09 ("The plain mandate of [past Supreme
Court] decisions is that without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to
the corporation, or... to the individual in his capacity as a custodian ... a corpo-
rate custodian ...may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth
Amendment grounds.").
207. See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that Does received actual notice of subpoenas).
208. See Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 10,
Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1143) (arguing
there was absence of legal basis for drawing distinction between corporate custo-
dian personally served and corporate custodian receiving actual notice of
subpoena).
209. For a further discussion of the potential impact of the Three Grand Jury
Subpoenas decision, see infra notes 210-28 and accompanying text.
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employees. 2 10 Moreover, the court signaled its. reluctance to apply the
white-collar rationale to a former employee's Fifth Amendment privilege
claim, thus leaving the collective entity doctrine little room to expand.2 11
The court effectively allowed a corporate custodian, required by law to
produce documents while employed, to unilaterally create a constitutional
privilege through the simple act of walking out of the corporation's door,
with corporate documents in hand.2 12 By allowing a corporate custodian
to permanently leave employment and assert a Fifth Amendment privi-
lege, the court created a substantial and dangerous loophole for corporate
custodians to evade the collective entity doctrine. 2 13
Despite the court's belief that cases of custodians absconding with
corporate documents would not change following its decision, such cases
may increase because of the court-created loophole. 214 Any such increase
will have a profound impact on the Justice Department's overall ability to
prosecute white-collar criminals, given that more white-collar crimes are
prosecuted in New York than anywhere in America. 215 Furthermore, the
decision has already had an impact beyond the Second Circuit because
corporate custodians elsewhere are trying to escape document production
by relying on this decision. 21 6
Significantly, the Three GrandJury Subpoenas decision will have practi-
cal consequences for the government, corporations and the courts.2 17
The government will now likely serve subpoenas on all employees, in addi-
tion to serving a corporation, because the court said that the Does would
have been precluded from asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege if they
210. See Gloves, Inc. v. Berger, No. Civ.A. 98-11970-NG, 2000 WL 1867960, at
*4 (D. Mass. Dec. 11, 2000) (describing Three Grand Jury Subpoenas as "the leading
case" to hold that former employee has Fifth Amendment right to resist producing
corporate documents); cf Appellant's Petition at 12 n.* (explaining that Three
GrandJury Subpoenas is significant because before Second Circuit's decision only
Ninth Circuit order that contained no reasoning and Third Circuit dicta stated
former employees may assert act-of-production privilege).
211. Cf Appellant's Petition at 14 (discussing impact of court's decision on
white-collar rationale).
212. See id. at 2, 9 (stating that corporate custodians may unilaterally create
constitutional privilege by leaving corporation's employ and taking documents).
213. See In reThree Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173, 187 (2d Cir. 1999)
(Cabranes,J., dissenting) (arguing that court created "'an obvious haven for those
who seek to frustrate the legitimate demands for the production of relevant corpo-
rate records .... ' (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d
807, 810 (11th Cir. 1992))).
214. Cf id. (stating that obstructionist behavior will rise as "direct result" of
court's holding).
215. Cf Carlson & Finn, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that two of five judicial
districts with greatest number of white-collar prosecutions are in New York).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Slonimsky, No. 00-2321, 2000 WL 1759721, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2000) (stating that former employee relied on Three Grand Jury
Subpoenas to argue act-of-production privilege shielded him from subpoena).
217. For a further discussion of the practical impact of Three GrandJury Subpoe-
nas, see infra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
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had been personally served while still employees. 2 18 Thus, at least in the
Second Circuit, the Fifth Amendment now hinges on wasteful and duplica-
tive subpoena practice. 219 The government will also likely begin to place
greater pressure on corporations to regain possession of documents, at a
time when white-collar criminal defense attorneys already criticize the gov-
ernment for the high-pressure tactics it employs. 220
Meanwhile, corporations will need to take measures to ensure that
departing employees do not take critical documents with them, as corpo-
rations are under a legal duty, under penalty of contempt, to produce
subpoenaed documents. 22 1 Moreover, the courts will likely be confronted
with more replevin actions, as corporations try to regain possession of cor-
porate documents when threatened with contempt. 222 Furthermore, the
courts will also be forced to handle more motions challenging subpoenas
because of the government's duplicative subpoena practice. 223
Finally, the Three Grand Juiy Subpoenas decision will have a profound
impact because it has further chiseled a split among the circuits. 224 Fol-
lowing the court's decision, employees in New York can leave their em-
ployment with evidence of corporate wrongdoing without fear of a grand
jury subpoena. 22 5 Meanwhile, former employees of the same corporation
in Washington, D.C. may be required to comply with a subpoena. 226 Cor-
porate custodians will therefore not find equal protection under the Fifth
218. See Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 182 n.4 (finding former em-
ployee may not assert Fifth Amendment privilege if personally served with sub-
poena while employed).
219. See Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at II
n.*, Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1143) (arguing
that impact of Three Grand Jury Subpoenas is that Fifth Amendment will turn on
formalistic distinctions and duplicate subpoena process).
220. See Rudolf & Maher, supra note 72, at 73 (stating that after Three Grand
Jury Subpoenas government will place more pressure on corporations). For an au-
thoritative discussion of "high-pressure" tactics the Government uses in white-col-
lar investigations, see Mark F. Pomerantz, Prosecuting Corporations: Applying the New
Department of Justice Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., July 10, 2000, at 9.
221. See Rudolf & Maher, supra note 72, at 73 (arguing that corporation will
face contempt sanctions if it fails to produce subpoenaed documents).
222. See Three Grand Juy Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 182-83 (stating that corpora-
tion can recover documents through replevin actions).
223. For a further discussion on why the government will engage in duplicate
subpoena practice, see supra note 218 and accompanying text.
224. Compare Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, 191 F.3d at 183 (recognizing that
former employee may assert act-of-production privilege), and Mora v. United
States, 71 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 1995) (same), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 813 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding
former employee may not assert act-of-production privilege), and In re Sealed Case,
950 F.2d 736, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same).
225. See Mark R. Kravitz, Developments in the Second Circuit: 1998-99, 32 CONN.
L. REv. 949, 987 (2000) (stating that after Three Grand Jury Subpoenas employees in
New York can assert privilege).
226. See id. (comparing employees in Washington, D.C., who cannot assert
privilege, with New York employees who can).
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Amendment privilege. 2 27 As a result, the Second Circuit's decision en-
sures that the ad hoc application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to doc-
umentary evidence will continue.
228
Thomasj. Koffer
227. For a further discussion of the impact that the circuit split will have on
custodians asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege, see supra notes 224-26 and
accompanying text.
228. For a further discussion of the ad hoc application of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to documentary evidence, see supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
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